India-Bangladesh Relations and the Chicken Neck Controversy: Geopolitical Tensions and Strategic Responses

Abstract

India-Bangladesh relations have experienced significant strain in 2025, exacerbated by provocative statements from Bangladesh’s interim government regarding India’s strategically vital Siliguri Corridor, colloquially known as the “Chicken’s Neck.” These remarks, coupled with Bangladesh’s growing alignment with China, have raised concerns about regional stability and India’s northeastern connectivity. This commentary examines Bangladesh’s perceived aggressions, the responses from Indian experts including Assam’s Chief Minister, the political and military dynamics within Bangladesh, potential Indian countermeasures, and the roles of global powers like the United States and China. Drawing on recent developments, the analysis underscores the need for diplomatic recalibration and strategic vigilance to maintain South Asian stability.

Introduction

India and Bangladesh share a complex relationship shaped by historical, cultural, and economic ties. The 4,096.7 km shared border, the longest India has with any neighbor, facilitates robust trade, with bilateral exchanges reaching USD 13 billion in FY 2023–24. However, the ousting of former Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in August 2024, following widespread protests, marked a turning point. The interim government led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus has adopted a posture perceived as hostile by India, particularly through remarks targeting the Siliguri Corridor, a 22–35 km wide strip connecting India’s northeastern states to the mainland. This corridor, dubbed the “Chicken’s Neck,” is a critical chokepoint, and any threat to its security is a significant concern for India. This commentary analyzes these tensions, focusing on Bangladesh’s statements, Indian responses, internal Bangladeshi dynamics, and the influence of external powers.

Bangladesh’s Aggressions and the Chicken’s Neck Narrative

The Siliguri Corridor, located in West Bengal and bordered by Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan, and China, is India’s sole land link to its eight northeastern states: Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Tripura, and Sikkim. Its narrow width makes it a strategic vulnerability, a concern amplified since the 1962 Sino-Indian War, when military experts warned that an attack could isolate the Northeast in hours. In March 2025, Muhammad Yunus, during a visit to China, described India’s Northeast as “landlocked” and positioned Bangladesh as the “only guardian of the ocean” for the region, suggesting it could serve as a maritime conduit. These remarks were interpreted in India as provocative, implying control over India’s access to its Northeast and aligning with Chinese interests.

Further escalating tensions, retired Bangladeshi Major General ALM Fazlur Rahman, a close aide to Yunus, suggested in a Facebook post that Bangladesh, in collaboration with China, could occupy India’s northeastern states if India attacked Pakistan. Though Dhaka distanced itself from Rahman’s statement, it fueled perceptions of aggression. Additionally, reports surfaced that Bangladesh, with Chinese assistance, plans to revive the Lalmonirhat airbase, located just 20 km from the Indian border and 100 km from the Siliguri Corridor. Indian security experts, including Brahma Chellaney, warned that an active airbase could enhance China’s surveillance capabilities over the corridor, posing a direct threat to India’s security.

These actions and statements have been perceived as attempts to exploit India’s geographical vulnerability, particularly as Bangladesh strengthens ties with China through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and military cooperation. The revival of the Lalmonirhat airbase and the proposed shift of the USD 1 billion Teesta River project from India to China underscore Dhaka’s pivot toward Beijing, raising alarms in New Delhi.

Indian Responses: Assam CM and Expert Perspectives

Indian leaders and experts have responded robustly to these developments. Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma has been particularly vocal, highlighting Bangladesh’s own geographical vulnerabilities. On May 25, 2025, Sarma posted on X, warning that Bangladesh has “two chicken necks” more vulnerable than India’s Siliguri Corridor. He identified the 80 km North Bangladesh Corridor, which could isolate the Rangpur division, and the 28 km Chittagong Corridor, connecting Dhaka to the economically critical Chittagong port, which handles over 90% of Bangladesh’s external trade. Sarma’s remarks were a direct retort to Yunus’s statements and Rahman’s provocations, emphasizing that any threat to India’s Chicken’s Neck could invite retaliation against Bangladesh’s vulnerable corridors.

Geostrategist Brahma Chellaney echoed Sarma’s concerns, noting that the Lalmonirhat airbase’s revival could serve as an intelligence hub for China, enhancing its ability to monitor Indian military movements. Other experts, including a retired Indian naval commander, pointed out the vulnerability of Bangladesh’s southeastern land bridge, a 17 km strip including Chittagong harbor, which could be targeted to disrupt the country’s trade. These responses underscore India’s readiness to counter perceived threats through strategic signaling and military preparedness.

Bangladesh’s Political and Military Perspectives

The political upheaval in Bangladesh following Hasina’s ouster has significantly influenced its stance toward India. The interim government under Yunus faces domestic challenges, including economic instability, rising inflation, and protests over job quotas. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), historically aligned with Pakistan and linked to groups like the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), may regain influence, potentially reversing Hasina’s pro-India policies. The arrest of Hindu monk Chinmoy Krishna Das on sedition charges and attacks on Bangladesh’s Hindu minority have further strained relations, with India raising concerns bilaterally and through UN mechanisms.

From a military perspective, Bangladesh Army Chief General Waker-Uz-Zaman has attempted to moderate anti-India rhetoric. In a January 2025 interview with Prothom Alo, he described India-Bangladesh relations as a “give-and-take relationship” based on fairness, emphasizing mutual dependence for economic and security needs. He acknowledged India’s interest in Bangladesh’s stability and urged India to address border killings and water-sharing disputes. However, reports of a military reshuffle promoting Islamist officers and the Akash Bijoy 2025 drill, attended by Yunus, suggest a hardening stance. The drill, conducted in April 2025, was framed as preparation for regional threats, with Yunus citing the India-Pakistan conflict as a rationale.

India’s Strategic Options

India faces a delicate balancing act in responding to Bangladesh’s actions. First, it must strengthen the security of the Siliguri Corridor. The Indian Army’s Trishakti Corps, headquartered at Sukna, is equipped with advanced weaponry, including Rafale jets and BrahMos missiles, and conducts regular drills to ensure readiness. Chief of Defence Staff General Anil Chauhan’s recent inspections underscore India’s commitment to fortifying the region.

Second, India should pursue diplomatic engagement to reset relations. Despite tensions, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Yunus met briefly at a BIMSTEC summit in April 2025, though no significant breakthroughs occurred. India could leverage cultural and economic ties, such as the USD 8 billion in credit extended for infrastructure projects like the Akhaura-Agartala rail link, to foster cooperation. Establishing joint task forces for border management and a digital connectivity corridor could address issues like illegal immigration and drug smuggling.

Third, India should counter China’s influence by enhancing economic engagement. The proposed free trade agreement (FTA), which could boost Bangladesh’s exports by 297% and India’s by 172%, should be prioritized despite current stagnation. Increasing foreign direct investment (FDI), currently low at USD 16 million in 2022, and supporting Bangladesh’s garment industry could strengthen economic ties.

Roles of the United States and China

China’s growing influence in Bangladesh is a primary concern for India. Beijing is Bangladesh’s largest arms supplier, providing fighter jets, artillery, and naval vessels, and has invested heavily in infrastructure through the BRI. The Lalmonirhat airbase and Teesta River projects signal China’s intent to expand its strategic footprint near India’s border, potentially undermining New Delhi’s regional influence. General Waker-Uz-Zaman described China as a “partner in development,” noting the affordability of its weapons.

The United States, while less prominent, maintains good relations with Bangladesh, as noted by General Waker-Uz-Zaman. The U.S. has expressed support for human rights in Bangladesh, with National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan engaging with Yunus on this issue. However, Washington’s influence is limited compared to China’s, and its neutral stance may not significantly alter the India-Bangladesh dynamic.

Conclusion

The recent tensions in India-Bangladesh relations, centered on the Siliguri Corridor, reflect a complex interplay of geopolitical, economic, and domestic factors. Bangladesh’s provocative statements and alignment with China have heightened India’s security concerns, prompting robust responses from leaders like Assam’s Chief Minister and experts like Brahma Chellaney. While Bangladesh’s interim government and military seek to balance relations, internal instability and growing Chinese influence complicate the landscape. India must bolster its military preparedness, pursue diplomatic engagement, and enhance economic ties to counter these challenges. The roles of China and the U.S. underscore the broader geopolitical stakes, with China’s strategic inroads posing a significant challenge to India’s regional influence. A rules-based, mutually beneficial relationship, as advocated by analysts, remains critical for South Asian stability.

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